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Preface
The nuclear decision in World War 11 came during efforts to end and
avoid war. Germany was defeated, Japan must next be forced to surrender
or suffer massive destruction, and Russia had begun to strain the peaceful
relations of allies in war. A momentous human decision was to be
made-how to use the awesome power of the atom in the context of war
and efforts to create a viable peace for all mankind.
This article offers a legal and historical analysis of the decision to use the
nuclear bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August of 1945-a decision
which the author believes had been interconnected with an identifiable
United States policy to avoid European boundary disputes, which had
racked the continent and the rest of the world with the horrors of war, and
to create a more lasting, viable peace through the structure of the. United
Nations. Many of the conclusions reached in this article are the result of
imperfect attempts to trace truth, but the paths of exploration are well
identified, so that the inquisitive reader might search further with some
guidelines for exploration.
The article is divided into two parts: (1) The Shimoda Case-the context
of legality and military necessity, and (2) Stopping Aggression-the context
of peace and strategic necessity. The reader should not expect "answers"
to questions raised-we are exploring the context of a decision and viewing
probability. Nevertheless, many of the simplistic viewpoints of varied
ideological underpinning can no longer be accepted.
*J.S.D. Candidate, Yale University, A.B. (1965), J.D. (1968), University of California at
Los Angeles; LL.M. (1972), University of Virginia. From Jan. 1969 to Jan. 1973 the author
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A. The Shimoda Case- The Context of Legality and Military Necessity
On December 7, 1963, the District Court of Tokyo delivered a lengthly
decision which concluded that the dropping of atomic and hydrogen bombs
on Hiroshima and Nagasaki on August 6 and 9, 1945, had violated in-
ternational law.1 There were several reasons for the court's conclusion but
there was no detailed analysis of the historical incidents which led to
President Truman's approval of the use of nuclear weapons to end the war
with Japan.
In fact, the Tokyo Court handled the "official" United States justifica-
tion of the use of nuclear weapons 2 in a rather indirect and conclusionary
manner, since the court seemed content with its own conclusions of in-
discriminate and severe injury and failed to explore the greater legal ques-
tion of whether or not such massive suffering and death was "necessary"
within the total international law and factual contexts.
It cannot be doubted that death and grotesque suffering took place, 3 or
that men of concern would find the results of the nuclear usage in war both
reprehensible and frightening; but that does not end an inquiry into the
legality of nuclear weapon utilization in 1945.
Several legal questions are left floating within the language of the court's
opinion; they are useful questions for a court to ask, but they are not
woven into a sufficiently tight legal analysis. For instance, the court quite
properly focused on three main questions which may be summarized as: (1)
were the results "unnecessary," (2) were the uses of the weapons on these
cities analogous to blind, uncontrollable or indiscriminate bombardment,
and (3) is the use of a nuclear weapon illegal per se;4 but the court's
conclusions seem trapped inside the narrow perspective it chose to util-
ize-a perspective which only entailed a view of the balance between
civilian death and suffering in those cities and the need to neutralize
traditional military targets which existed within those cities.
If one engages only in the rather myopic consideration of the number of
civilian casualities as opposed to traditional targets within the cities, then it
is quite probable that jurists would conclude that the bomb attacks did not
"discriminate" between "proper" targets and civilians, that the effects of
1See R. Falk, The Shimoda Case: A Legal Appraisal of the Atomic Attacks upon
Hiroshima and Nagasaki, 59 AM.J.I.L. 759(1965) (hereinafter cited as Falk). The court's
opinion is reprinted in full at 8 JAPANESE ANNUAL OF INT'L L. 212-252 (1964).2So called by Falk, id. at 765, citing Stimson, The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb, 194
Harper's Magazine 97(1947), and I TRUMAN, MEMOIRS-YEAR OF DECISIONS
419-420(1955). The "official" justification was that the bombing tended to hasten the end of
the war, and thereby reduce the number of deaths and injuries on both sides.3See Falk, at 760-76 1.4 See also Professor Falk's different outline of the legal questions, id.at 776.
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the bombs were "blind" and "uncontrollable," and that the resultant death
and suffering was "unnecessary."
This, it seems, was exactly what the court did, although it also found
enough "evidence" in its myriad of conclusions to take an additional step
and declare that the use of nuclear weapons must be illegal per se(in any
context).5 The main criticism of the court's opinion, then, can be found in
Professor Falk's own realization:
It must be observed that the opinion makes no effort to examine whether, in
fact, the attacks upon Hiroshima and Nagasaki hastened the end of the war
and saved lives on both sides.6
And to Professor Falk's own words should be added the statement that
the proper legal focus should not merely be concerned with whether or not
more lives were in fact saved, but also with whether those who made the
decision to drop the bombs could have reasonably concluded that more
lives would probably have been saved by the use of the weapons even if, in
fact, more were or were not. Furthermore, the inquiry should also include a
focus on the human suffering involved with each choice, since one of the
relevant legal standards is found in the phrase "unnecessary suffering."
Additionally, it should be pointed out that a proper legal focus should
concern the permissible scope of precept interpretation which existed at
that time (the time of the decision) and in the inhumane circumstance of
"total" war. For although there is a great deal of authoritative pronounce-
ment today that the civilian population cannot be made an object of direct
attack and that efforts must at all times be made to discriminate between
the general population and armed combatants, 7 such was regrettably not
iThe court completely ignored the possible uses of a "clean" weapon or a tactical
weapon, which would entail a destructive capacity and outcome no greater than conventional
bombs.6Falk, at 775.7See, e.g., United Nations G.A. Res. 2444, 23 U.N. GAOR, Supp. 18, at 50, U.N. Doc.
A/7218(1969), which adopted Res. XXVIII of the XXth International Conference of the Red
Cross at Vienna (1965), reprinted at 75 INT'L REV. OF THE RED CROSS 305 (1967). It should
be noted that the U.N. General Assembly refused to adopt part of the Vienna Conference
Resolution which would have prohibited the use of nuclear weapons. As stated, however, this
norm was somewhat changed by bombing practice since the early twentieth century, see infra
note 26; but contemporarv efforts are being made to regain the comprehensive content of such
a norm and to specify greater guidelines for aerial warfare. See ICRC, I BAsIc TEXTS,
PROTOCOLS I & II (Geneva Jan. 1972). The emerging present consensus will reflect the "true"
state of customary international law before the rise of air usage in the Second World War. See
U.S. Army, FM 27-10, THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE, para. 25 (1956) (hereinafter cited as
FM 27-10), which now states that it is a "generally recognized rule of international law that
civilians must not be made the object of attack directed exclusively against them." See also J.
Paust, My Lai and Vietnam: Norms, Myths and Leader Responsibility, 57 MIL. L. REV. 99,
139- 140 n. 156(1972); and H. De Saussure, The Laws of Air Warfare: Are There Any?, 23
NAVAL WAR COLL. REV. 35 (1971). Today we can recapture the humane consensus of
prohibition against attacks on noncombatants, terror attacks or morale bombings, and attacks
on enemy "sympathizers" or "oppressors," but it must be admitted that greater guidelines for
decision-makers are still needed.
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the nature of the war of the 1940's, nor was there any clear consensus of
expectation at the time that populations may never be the object of attack
for any purpose."
In fact, the only relevant prohibitions concerned the principle of "unnec-
essary" suffering, 9 the prohibition against the use of poison, 10 and the
principles which emerge from a comparison of Article 25 of the Annex to
the 1907 Hague Convention No. IV Respecting the Laws and Customs of
War on Land, which prohibited the attack or bombardment of "unde-
fended" towns, villages, dwellings or buildings, and Article 2 of the 1907
Hague Convention No. IX Concerning Bombardment by Naval Forces in
Time of War, which allowed the proportionate engagement of or attack on
military targets within an undefended city."
It is true that certain Draft Rules of Air Warfare proposed in 1923
would have changed the legal result, but these were never adopted as a part
of international law and it seems that it was rather improper and simplistic
for the Tokyo Court to have relied on the draft rules for its conclusions.' 2
For present purposes only the relevant law will be considered, and then,
to start the inquiry, only the balance between "unnecessary suffering" and
8For example, there was extensive bombardment of London and other allied cities by the
Nazi ally of Japan, and there had been extensive bombardment of German and Japanese cities
by the Allies prior to August 5, 1945 (e.g., Dresden and Tokyo); and many authors have
considered that if norms applied to aerial war they had lapsed as a consequence of persistent
violation. See M. McDOUGAL, F. FELICIANO, LAW AND MINIMUM WORLD PUBLIC ORDER
640-659 (1961); and SPAIGHT, AIR POWER AND WAR RIGHTS (3 ed. 1947). On cities bombed
in World War I1 and the legality of the Allied bombings, see United States v. Ohlendorf, IV
TRIALS OF WAR CRIMES 466, 467(1948) (hereinafter cited at T.W.C.): FENWICK, IN-
TERNATIONAL LAW 678 (4 ed. 1965) (hereinafter cited as Fenwick); and for evidence of
Japanese bombings of towns and cities see SPAIGHT, AIR POWER AND WAR RIGHTS
280-281(3 ed. 1947) (hereinafter cited as Spaight). On unrestricted practice in World War I
see FENWICK, at 676-677; and infra note 34.
9A principle found in the Hague Convention No. IV, Annex, Article 23(e) (1907), 36
Stat. 2277, T.S. No. 539, League of Nations, Treaty Series vol. XCIV(1929), No. 213(hereinafter cited as H.C. IV), which was recognized as a principle of customary international
law in the Judgment of the IMT at Nuremberg, I TRIAL OF MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS 254
(1947) (hereinafter cited as IMT, Nuremberg and T.M.W.C.).10H.C. IV, Annex, Article 23(a). Also relevant here would have been the growing
acceptance of legal values found in the 1925 Geneva Gas Protocol; though it has not yet been
signed by the United States.
"H.C. IV, Annex, Article 25; and H.C. IX, Article 2, 36 Stat. 2351, T.S. No. 542, 18
Oct. 1907. A notable precedent to each was the 1863 Lieber Code, see infra.
12See Falk, at 770-772; the draft rules are reprinted at 17 AM. J.I.L., SUPP. 242 (1923).
Professor Falk noted that the draft rules were "non-binding," that the Tokyo Court's con-
clusion that these rules which were "never even intended for formal ratification" (Falk)
became "authoritative" was an undocumented conclusion, and that there was a "consistent
pattern of non-adherence to the standards prescribed by the Draft Rules." Indeed, the world
seems in no greater security today from a "sanctified" moral evil from the air, for there exists
a paucity of authoritative norms to curtail civilian death and suffering-our cities are still the
hostages of a nuclear stalemate. See H. DeSaussure, The Laws of Air Warfare: Are There
Any? supra note 7; and H. DeSaussure, The Laws of Air Warfare: Are There Any? 5 THE
INT'L LAWYER 527(1971). C.f. supra note 7.
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"military necessity," since conclusions of "indiscriminate" or "uncon-
trolled" suffering arise out of the inquiry into the balance between the
"unnecessary" and "necessity" and an application of the interconnected
rule of proportionality. The prohibition against the use of poison or poi-
soned weapons will not be considered here since the present author lacks
the scientific data necessary for a proper treatment. 13
However, it should be pointed out that it is a proper question to explore,
especially when many of those involved with the decision to drop the
bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki had before them a report which in-
dicated a bomb potential for certain radioactive effects (though even that
radioactive potential may have been insufficient for a conclusion that the
weapons whose primary characteristics involved blast, heat and fire were
illegal per se or illegal under the circumstances of use).14 The Tokyo Court
did not decide this question either and stated, "there is not an established
theory among international jurists in connection with the difference of
poison, poison-gas, bacterium, etc. from atomic bombs."' 15
As one begins the exploration of the "necessity" involved in the use of
the nuclear weapons against Japan, he should discover the general content
of the relevant rules of war. As stated, the primary legal consideration
involves the principle of military "necessity" as opposed to the counter
principle of "unnecessary" suffering-principles which are more easily
"
3See also II OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 348 (7th ed. 1952) (hereinafter cited as
11 Oppenheim); SCHWARZENBERGER, THE LEGALITY OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS (London 1958);
and McDOUGAL AND FELICIANO, LAW AND MINIMUM WORLD PUBLIC ORDER
666-667(1961); and M. GREENSPAN, THE MODERN LAW OF LAND WARFARE 371-375
(1959). It cannot be doubted that hideous after-effects occurred long after the dropping of the
bombs. See, e.g., Spaight, at 275. But are these thrown into the equation which balances death
and suffering with necessity, or do they add to the conclusion that the weapon is per se illegal?
For a consideration of radioactive effects as "poison" see The Int'l. Law Ass'n., Report of the
Fiftieth Conference held at Brussels, 1962, at 192 and 219- 221 (G. Schwarzenberger rappor-
teur 1963). It is suspected now that nuclear effects have also led to or aided the growth of
cancer. See -38 Survivors of A-Bombing Die in Hiroshima Hospital," N.Y.T. Aug. 5, 1973 at
3, col. 3.14See FEIs, BETWEEN WAR AND PEACE-THE POTSDAM CONFERENCE 165- 171 (1960)
(hereinafter cited as Feis, Potsdam), reproducing the Groves Memorandum on the nuclear
test of 16 July 1945 (dated July 18th) which was read by President Truman at Potsdam on
July 21st. The memorandum stated that radioactive materials were deposited over a wide
area, and some were found up to 120 miles from the point of explosion, but that "at no place
did it reach a concentration which required evacuation of the population" (indicating that
some radioactivity would be high in the target area but not of any real importance outside of
that area).
15See Falk, at 775, quoting the Court's opinion at 241. Since World War ii much
development in shared expectation and prohibition against certain types of chemical, biolog-
ical and bacteriological warfare has taken place as evidenced by the Nixon declarations and
new treaties. A useful reference to developed and developing norms in this area is Moore,
Ratification of the Geneva Protocol on Gas and Bacteriological Warfare: A Legal and
PoliticalAnalysis, 58 VA. L. REV. 419(1972).
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stated than applied with any precision. 16 The principle of military necessity
had an early recognition as a rule of customary international law and found
expression in two notable documents of the ninteenth century.
The 1863 Lieber Code, which had been promulgated by President Lin-
coln and Major General Halleck to regulate the conduct of United States
troops in the field, contained many references to military necessity; 17 but
three articles seem to express the nuances of the concept. Article 14 stated
that military necessity "consists in the necessity of those measures which
are indispensable for securing the ends of the war, and which are lawful
according to the modern law and usages of war." (emphasis added.)
Articles 15 and 16 added, however, that military necessity "admits of all
direct destruction of life or limb of armed enemies," but does not admit of
"cruelty" ("suffering for the sake of suffering or for revenge"), "nor of
maiming or wounding except in fight," nor of the use of poison, "nor of
torture to extort confessions ... nor the wanton devastation of a district."
Article 19 is also relevant in that it allowed the bombardment of a place
without warning if such was necessary (though a warning was to be given
"whenever admissible" so that noncombatants could leave the area).' 8
The 1868 Declaration of St. Petersburg' 9 further declared that "the only
legitimate object which States should endeavor to accomplish during War
is to weaken the military forces of the enemy; That for this purpose it is
sufficient to disable the greatest possible number of men; That this object
would be exceeded by the employment of arms which uselessly aggravate
the sufferings of disabled men, or renders their death inevitable .... (em-
phasis added.)
These early pronouncements contain important legal concepts, but a
definite answer to the search by no means leaps out from the words
t6See TAYLOR, NUREMBERG AND VIETNAM: AN AMERICAN TRAGEDY 35 (1970), cor-
rectly stating that "no form of words can resolve the essential difficulty, which is that
'necessity' is a matter of infinite circumstantial variation."
"7General Orders No. 100, Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United
States in the Field (1863). The Lieber Code was considered as exemplifying customary
international law in DIG. OPS. OF JAG, ARMY 244 (GPO 1866), and was primarily the result
of the works of Dr. Francis Lieber. The Lieber Code later became the basis for the 1899 and
1907 Hague Conventions, but of course none of these were designed to cover aerial warfare
(as that had not been experienced). C.f. 1907 Hague Declaration prohibiting the discharge of
projectiles from balloons.
18Note that warnings were given to the Japanese concerning the bombings of Hiroshima
and Nagasaki by air leaflet, and indirectly by the Potsdam Declaration (warning of prompt and
utter destruction). See FIEs, THE ATOMIC BOMB AND THE END OF WORLD WAR II, 108
(1970) (hereinafter cited as Feis, Bomb).
19Quoted in IIl PHILIMORE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 160- 162 (3 ed. 1885) and U.S. DEPT.
OF ARMY, PAM. No. 27-161-2, INTERNATIONAL LAW 277-278 (1962).
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themselves, 20 since it could be argued that the nuclear bombings of Japa-
nese cities were legal within the normative phraseology, in that the bomb-
ings were measures that were "indispensable" for securing the ends of war
(one being the return to peace or the end of the war itself), and were not a
"wanton" devastation of cities but a destruction with a specific military
purpose of weakening the armed forces of the enemy to the point of
submission to peace, even though that military objective involved the death
of noncombatants.
Later rules of war equally inconclusive for our purpose since Article
23(e) of the Hague Convention No. IV, Annex, prohibited "unnecessary"
suffering and Article 25 outlawed any bombardment of "undefended" cities
in the context of land combat, but Article 2 of the Hague Convention No.
IX allowed a precision or proportionate bombardment of military targets
even though they were located within an undefended city in the case of
naval involvement (which is more anaologous to air involvement, due to a
similar inability of the aircraft commander to land his craft and walk over
to the targets to blow them up with a demolition team and then depart).2 '
The present United States position is that military necessity will allow
"those measures not forbidden by international law which are in-
dispensable for securing the complete submission of the enemy as soon as
possible." 22 It is also stated that the loss of life must not be "out of
proportion to the military advantage to be gained" (the rule of proportional-
ity);2 3 and that the use of atomic weapons is not prohibited per se.24 The
2 0Perhaps this comes from a lawyer's inability to take the more positive approach of
Humpty Dumpty who told Alice that words mean whatever he wanted them to mean-no
more, no less, and that it was simply a question of who shall be the master. See also
McDOUGAL, FELICIANO, LAW AND MINIMUM WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 5 n. 9 and 103- 104
(1961); and McDOUGAL, LASSWELL, MILLER, THE INTERPRETATION OF AGREEMENTS AND
WORLD PUBLIC ORDER(1967).21See U.S. DEPT. OF ARMY, PAM. No.27-161-2, supra note 19 at 48.
22FM 27-10, para. 3 a. A more extensive consideration of this principle can be found in
Paust, My Lai and Vietnam: Norms, Myths and Leader Responsibility, 57 MIL. L. REV.
99(1972); and the comment on command responsibility and military necessity, 26 NAVAL
WAR COLLEGE REV. 103- 107 (Feb. 1973).
23FM 27-10, para. 41. For a comprehensive analytical framework for inquiry into the
principle of proportionality as it relates to present expectations and developing human rights
see McDougal, Lasswell, Chen, Human Rights and World Public Order: A Framework for
Policy-Oriented Inquiry, 63 AM.J.I.L. 237, 267-268(1969), stating: "The principle of pro-
portionality requires that measures in derogation ... be limited in intensity and magnitude to
what is reasonably necessary promptly to secure the permissible objectives of derogation
under the established conditions of necessity. Values must not be unnecessarily destroyed.
The requirements of proportionality can be ascertained by relating to the process of responses
to crisis..." (listing: participants, perspectives, arenas or situations of interaction, base or
resource values, strategies employed, outcomes, effects).241bid. at para. 35. See also U.K., Ill MANUAL OF MILITARY LAW, THE LAWS OF WAR
ON LAND, para. 113 (London 1958); H. Lauterpacht, The Problem of the Revision of the Law
of War, 29 BRIT. YRBK. I.L. 360, 370 (1952); II Oppenheim, at 347-351; and McDougal,
Feliciano, at 659-660 and 667.
International Lawyer, Vol. 8, No. I
Nuclear Decisions in World War 1I
legal analyst is left, then, with the same types of word inquiry that arise
from the normative values of the ninteenth century enactments, i.e. wheth-
er the nuclear bombings were in proportion to a military objective to end
the war as soon as possible, and whether the destruction of populated areas
for that purpose was a lawful military objective.
The important question to which the Tokyo Court did not really address
itself, was whether a city itself could have constituted a lawful "military
objective" or military target within the context of the "total war" of the
1940s. As Professor Falk stated in this regard, "(t)he court, it must be said,
seems somewhat confused on this set of issues. For it enumerates 'food,
trade' and 'human factors like population, man-power, etc.' as being within
the narrower concept of total war to which it subscribes (p. 240). But it is
evident that if people are military objectives, then the attacks on Hiroshima
and Nagasaki are legitimate within its own terms." 25
Indeed, it seems that all of the conclusions as to "unnecessary
suffering," the "proportionate" utilization of weaponry, "indiscriminate"
attacks, "uncontrollable" weapons (except, perhaps, in connection with
radioactivity), and "wanton" or "cruel" devastation in the legal con-
text-to some degree all suffering in war is "cruel" in the moral sense) are
really hinged upon the question of what constituted a proper military target
under the circumstances.
On this point legal scholars differ, 26 and in fact one court stated that in
the context of World War 11, the Allied bombings of cities were "an act of
legitimate warfare," and that the purpose of the air bombardment war to
effect the surrender of the bombed nation;27 but one can state that there is
2Falk at 773. See also STONE, LEGAL CONTROLS OF INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT
630-631 (1959), concerning the notion of an attack on the enemy's work force. It should be
noted that if starvation (attacks on food, trade) of the Japanese people to end the war would
have been proper, and scholars traditionally agree that it would have been, it could have
involved more death and human suffering before the end result was reached than the nuclear
weapons produced; and isn't such a consideration important in the strategic context of what is
necessary or involves the least amount of death and suffering and is capable of achieving the
military objective? See Bismark's comment on the sieges of Metz and Paris in 1870, in 11
GARNER, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE WORLD WAR 337 (he felt that both bombardment
and starvation were legitimate and neither more humane per se).2 6See, e.g., McDougal and Feliciano, at 640-668, and authorities cited; and 11 Oppen-
heim, at 349, stating, "(w)hile aerial bombardment may-by complying with the requirement,
however widely conceived, of 'military objective'-remain within the orbit of legality, the use
of an atomic bomb against a city can comply with that requirement only in very exceptional
cases." C.f., Greenspan, supra note 13, at 371-372; and Spaight. supra note 8, at 274-277.
27United States v. Ohlendorf, IV T.W.C. 466, 467 (1948). C.f., H. Lauterpacht, The
Problem of the Revision of the Law of War, supra note 24, at 378- 379, stating that it cannot
be a legitimate military objective to terrorize the civilian community with the ultimate aim of
transmitting such pressure to the enemy political elite and compelling acceptance of the
attacker's political demands, since to accept such morale or terror bombardment would come
too close to rendering all law pointless in war. This, of course, is one of the fundamental
questions: was terrorism permissible in certain instances within the context of total war and
the need to end it?
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at least more of a basis for legality than the Tokyo Court was willing to
face or seek to disprove.
On a related question of population center targets it should be noted that
the bombardment of centers to promote fear in the population and pressure
on state elites to surrender has been associated with the prohibition of
terrorism in warfare. On the question of terrorism, there is respected
authority for the position that the customary law of war and practice have
prohibited terrorism as an intentional strategy.28 Moreover, there were at
least two commissions established early in the twentieth century for the
purpose of articulating the established norms of the law of war and they
identified a widespread denunciation of terrorism as well as murder, mas-
sacres, torture and collective penalties.2 9 A third group charged with the
investigation of the German control of Belgium in World War I concluded
that a deliberate "system of general terrorization" of the population to gain
quick control of the region was contrary to the rules of civilized warfare,
and that German claims of military necessity and reprisal action were
unfounded.30 The pre-World War I German Staff and jurists had openly
favored terrorization of civilians in war zones to hasten victory or in
occupied territory to insure control of the population;31 but these views
2 8See Q. Wright, The Bombardment of Damascus, 20 AM.J.I.L. 263, 273 (1926); ASIL
Report, Subcommittee No. 1, To restate the established rules of international law, 1921
PROCEEDINGS OF THE ASIL 102, 104 (1921), stating that "treacherous killings, massacres and
terrorism are not allowed by the laws of war;" I J.W. GARNER, INT'L LAW AND THE WORLD
WAR 283 (1920); E. STOWELL, H. MUNRO, INT'L CASES 173- 176 (1916); and II WHEATON'S
ELEMENTS OF INT'L LAW 789-790 (6 ed. 1929). See also the 1818 trial of Arbuthnot and
Ambrister, Ill WHARTON'S DIG. OF THE INT'L LAW OF THE U.S. 326, 328 (1886); and the
Code of Articles of King Gustavus Adolphus of Sweden, art. 97(1621), reprinted at Winthrop
907, 913, stating that no man shall "tyrannize over any Churchmen, or aged people, men or
women, maides or children, unless they first take up arms .... This prohibition grew into the
customary prohibition of any form of violence against noncombatants. See Winthrop at 778
and 843 (concerning the case of the "anarchist Pallas, tried by a court-martial at Barcelona in
September, 1893).29See Report Presented to the Preliminary Peace Conference by the Commission on the
Responsibility of the Authors of the War and on Enforcement and Penalties, List of War
Crimes, items no. 1, 3 and 17 (1919) (copy at U.S. Army TJAG School) (members were:
U.S., British Empire, France, Italy, Japan, Belgium, Greece, Poland, Romania, Serbia); and
ASIL Report, supra note 27a. It was not clear whether all forms of violent terrorism
(including terrorization of combatants not in force control) was denounced, but a general ban
on terrorism was affirmed along with other strategies generally utilized only against com-
batants or against both combatants and noncombatants (i.e., assassination, use of prohibited
weapons, treachery, etc.).
30See Report of the Bryce Committee, 1914, extract at E. STOWELL, H. MUNRO, INT'L
CASES 173(1916). The Bryce Report added that the murder of large numbers of innocent
civilians is "an act absolutely forbidden by the rules of civilized warfare;" id. at 176.31For a brief consideration of the German jurists and the Prussian War-book see T.
BATY, J. MORGAN, WAR: ITS CONDUCT AND LEGAL RESULTS 176 and 180-181(London
1915). Karl von Clausewitz in 1832 had favored terrorizing the occupied populace including a
spread of the "fear of responsibility, punishment, and ill-treatment which in such cases presses
like a general weight against the whole population... ;" see id. at 180 n. 1; and I J.W.
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and implementary actions during the War were widely denounced as un-
lawful strategies. 32
Despite this background on the general prohibition of terrorism, how-
ever, Stowell had identified a problem in connection with air bombardment
that was of great importance. He placed this problem before the commu-
nity in 1931 when he stated that he recognized that under inherited ex-
pectations "the shocking inhumanity of acts of terrorism was rightly con-
sidered to be disproportionate to the military advantage to be derived from
their use," but "the conditions of modern warfare as exemplified in the last
war have given rise to serious doubts" concerning condemnation of acts
against the civilian population "intended to break down the stamina of the
civilian population and to cause them to become so weary of further
resistance that they would induce their government to sue for peace." 33 He
also stated that an "impartial observer must recognize that the last war
constitutes a precedent for directing operations against the civilian popu-
lation in order to make them crave peace, and induce their government to
submit."'34 But, he added, a study should be made of this problem in terms
of these modern conditions of war, the military impact of such usages, the
psychological outcomes among the civilians, and the long-term effects of
such terrorism "on the post-war survival of natural animosities and bicker-
ings which will render the preservation of peace much more difficult."
3 5
GARNER, INT'L LAW AND THE WORLD WAR 278-282 and 328 (1920). Garner added that it
was "entirely in accord with the doctrines of the German militarists that war is a con-
test ... against the civil population as well, that violence, ruthlessness, and terrorism are
legitimate measures, and that whatever tends to shorten the duration of the war is per-
missible;" supra at 328. It is not clear whether Baty and Morgan repudiated the German
views; but most other writers did. See J.W. GARNER, supra, at 283.
32See, e.g., E. STOWELL, H. MUNRO, supra note 30; J.W. GARNER, supra note 3 1, at 283;
11 WHEATON'S ELEMENTS OF INT'L LAW 789-790 (6 ed. 1929); and France, Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, GERMANY'S VIOLATIONS OF THE LAWS OF WAR, 1914- 1915 at 77-215 (J.
Bland trans. 1915). C.f. E. STOWELL, INT'L LAW 523-526 (1931), arguing for a reconsidera-
tion of the German claim of permissible terror in cases where the principle of military
necessity applies and warning of a "precedent" for a World War I1 calamity which he could
only dimly envision and would not deny. The 1949 Geneva Conventions would prohibit all
acts of terrorism against protected persons regardless of military necessity claims, but Sto-
well's remarks were significant with respect to certain World War II bombardments which
were most likely permissible then but would be condemned today. See McDougal, Feliciano,
at 79-80 and 652-657.33See E. STOWELL, INTERNATIONAL LAW 524 (193 1).
34 1d. at 525. See also J. GARNER, RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
174(Calcutta 1925); and J. Garner,Proposed Rules for the Regulation of Aerial Warfare, 18
AM.J.I.L. 56, 65 (1924) but in each case expressing the desire that such acts be proscribed).
35See STOWELL, id. at 524 n. 2, 525 n. 4 and 526. For his view after the dropping of the
bombs see Comment, The Laws of War and the Atomic Bomb, 39 AM.J.I.L. 784, 786
(1945). See also L. Nurick, The Distinction Between Combatant and Noncombatant in the
Law of War, 39 AM.J..L.680 (1945) (at 690, decrying the paucity of rules governing aerial
bombardment, citingJ. Garner, 3 AIR. L. REV. 318 (1932). Today one might cite DeSaussure
in the same manner, see supra note 12); and J. SPAIGHT, AIR POWER AND WAR RIGHTS
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Since World War It distinguished authorities have recaptured the need
for a peremptory norm which prohibits the intentional terrorization of the
civilian population as such or the intentional use of a strategy which
produces terror that is not "incidental to lawful" combat operations. 36
Underlying these viewpoints are policy considerations involving the need
for limiting the types of permissible participants and strategies in the
process of armed violence and a shared awareness of the need to prohibit
the deliberate terrorization of populations in order to preserve any "vestige
of the claim that war can be regulated at all" and to save from extinction
the "human rights" limitations on the exercise of armed coercion within the
social process. 37 As if to reaffirm these trends in expectation the 1949
Geneva Conventions contained a specific peremptory prohibition of "all
measures" of "terrorism"; 38 and numerous humane treatment provisions
prohibit these and related acts of violence in all circumstances. It should be
noted, however, that one of these authorities, Sir Lauterpacht, had stated
that civilians per se must never be targets and that "indiscriminate" attacks
were outlawed, but that in the context of the Second World War there may
have been a distinction between these impermissible acts and the bombing
of "civilian centers" for imperative military objectives "in an age of total
warfare." He also made a distinction between the peremptory prohibition
of "intentional terrorization -or destruction-of the civilian population as
an avowed or obvious object of attack" and induced terror which is
"incidental to lawful operations." 39
What is merely "incidental" to lawful military operations is a key ques-
tion which should be approached with a comprehensive map of policy and
context. Otherwise the community will be drawing fine conclusionary lines
12-13 (London 1933) (warning that the bombing of civilian objectives will be a primary
operation of war).
36See H. Lauterpacht, The Problem of the Revision of the Law of War, supra note 24 at
378-379; McDougal, Feliciano, at 79-80, 652 and 656-658; Carnegie Endowment for Int'l
Peace, REPORT OF THE CONFERENCE ON CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS OF THE LAW OF
ARMED CONFLICTS 39, 42(1971); and U.N. S.G. Report, Measures to Prevent International
Terrorism Which Endangers or Takes Innocent Human Lives or Jeopardizes Fundamental
Freedoms, and Study of the Underlying Causes of Those Forms of Terrorism and Acts of
Violence Which Lie in Misery, Frustration, Grievance and Despair and Which Cause Some
People to Sacrifice Human Lives, Including Their Own, in an Attempt to Effect Radical
Changes, 27 U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doc. A/C. 6/418 (Nov. 2, 1972).See also, J. Paust, Possible
Legal Responses to International Terrorism: Prevention, Punishment and Cooperative Ac-
tion, forthcoming, and references cited.
37See supra note 36.38See Geneva Civilian Convention, art. 33. See also J. Pictet (ed.), IV Commentary at
3 1, 40, 225-226 and 594; and J. Paust, Possible Legal Responses to International Terrorism,
supra note 36.39See H. Lauterpacht, The Problem of the Revision of the Law of War, supra note 24, at
365- 369.
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between attacks on populations per se and population "centers," or be-
tween "intentional" terror and foreseeable "incidental" terror, in a manner
unresponsive to all community values. It is assumed that Professor
McDougal would approach the question this way, but it is not clear
whether he would now ban outright the "incidental" population terror
utilized to coerce state political elites (or is such ever merely "incidental"
to a military objective when utilized as an essential component of the
process?). 40 Today, even if the community outlaws all attacks on popu-
lation "centers" (we still seem to be hostages in a nuclear balance), this
question of "incidential" terror in armed conflict seems unavoidable.
The Tokyo Court would not consider the argument that a city itself
could constitute a valid military objective in connection with the need to
end the war as soon as possible,41 and additionally considered that the
cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki were "undefended" cities (apparently
acknowledging a possible justification for obliteration if cities were defend-
ed), 42 and as such were not legally subject to massive bombardment.
Actually the Tokyo Court took a rather restrictive view of the nature of a
"defended" city since it stated that a defended city is "a city resisting any
possible occupation by land forces."' 4
But it should be added that the traditional view of "defended" in-
corporates a consideration of the existence of anti-aircraft weapons or
enemy planes which constitute potential obstacles to approaching air-
craft, 44 and there was no indication from the court's opinion that Hiro-
shima and Nagasaki could not have met the latter test for a "defended"
city, nor any indication that troops were not within the cities.
The Tokyo Court's judgment was further incomplete, since there was
absolutely no consideration of the arguments in favor of reprisal or retali-
40See McDougal, Feliciano at 657-658; but compare id. at 80 n. 195 and 660 n. 421 with
id. at 668.
41See Falk at 773 n. 32 and 775. Possibly because of its reliance on the unadopted 1923
Draft Rules which would prohibit such attacks, the Court would not further explore the
question. See Falk, at 772.42 0n this legal point compare the rule that military targets within an undefended city
must only be attacked with prescise fire power, supra note 23, with Spaight, at 261, 271 and
273; and Greenspan, supra note 13. at 336-337(concerning "military effectiveness" and the
qualified right to bombard a defended city without a great amount of discrimination or by
"target-area bombing").
43Falk, at 772.
44See, e.g., Spaight, at 273; FM 27-10, para. 40, stating "(d)efended places in the sense of
Article 25, HR, include: ... (b) A city or town surrounded by detached defense positions,
which is considered jointly with such defense positions as an indivisible whole, (c) A place
which is occupied by a competent military force .. "; Greenspan, supra note 13, at
336-337; and 11 Oppenheim at 418 (the answer depends on varied circumstances and is "not
always free from doubt").
International Lawyer, Vol. 8, No. I
172 INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
ation (which allow an otherwise illegal response to an enemy's prior illegal
response if certain conditions are met).5
Perhaps the most that can be said, however, is that a complete legal
analysis of the nuclear destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki should
involve outcomes of language interpretation and fact application upon
which reasonable men can differ; but for purposes of this article, it is
necessary to move beyond these difficulties and consider the further ques-
tion whether it was "necessary" to destroy the cities even if they could
have been said to constitute valid military objectives in the total war
context of the 1940s.
This is an important consideration for several reasons: (1) it is relevant
to conclusions as to whether or not the cities could have properly con-
stituted "military objectives" under the preceeding legal focus; (2) it is
relevant to questions of a proportionate or discriminate utilization of the
weapons; and (3) it is relevant to the interplay between the policy behind
the old rules of "defended" cities, and the broader policies involved with
the principle of military necessity (especially the policy involved with the
need to end the war quickly with less death and suffering).
And highly relevant to this question of "necessity" is the general rule
that belligerents may utilize the most effective means available of accom-
plishing the military objective with the least sacrifice of time, lives and
suffering, 46 provided that the means are not otherwise prohibited by some
positive rule of international law. 47 In other words, if the bombings of those
cities were not otherwise prohibited, can an argument be made that it was
necessary to destroy them since their destruction was the most effective
means available for ending the war with the least sacrifice of time, life and
suffering?
In this connection one should explore a comparison of the losses of life
and the suffering which resulted from the utilization of the bombs as
opposed to that which would have been predictable from other feasible
alternatives, such as starvation (which would probably have involved
45For evidence of Japanese bombings which obliterated towns and cities, see Spaight, at
280-281. For the legality of reprisal action, see U.S. DEPT. OF ARMY, PAM. No.27-161-2,
supra note 19, at 64-67; and United States v. List, II T.W.C. 757, 1250-1252, and
1270- 1271(1948).46See U.S. WAR DEPT., RULES OF LAND WARFARE, para. 4 (1940); and United States v.
List, II T.W.C. 757, 1253 (1948). Compare with this the 1863 Lieber Code acceptance of
"those measures which are indispensable for securing the ends of the war."
Today the phrase might read: A commander may utilize the most effective lawful means
available of accomplishing an otherwise legitimate military mission with the least excess
amount of foreseeable death, destruction or suffering. See FM 27-10, paras.3, 25, 34. 41 and
56(1956).47See, e.g., FM 27-10, para. 3.a.; and United States v. List, II T.W.C. 757, 1255 (1948).
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suffering which greatly exceeded that at Hiroshima and Nagasaki since it
would have involved most of the population of Japan), or a massive
invasion of the main islands of the homeland of Japan; and then further
consider whether any of these would have even been necessary in view of
the Japanese peace efforts (to be explored hereunder). An analysis of
available alternative strategies also provides a more comprehensive focus
on the interactions of the war participants and it can provide relevant
indicia of objectives (demands for value outcome and expectations) and
base values (resources at the disposal of each participant) which are highly
useful for a contextually realistic analysis of legality.
No figures are available for the starvation strategy, but estimates were
made in connection with the optional massive land invasion of the Japanese
homeland. It was estimated by the military strategists under General Mac-
Arthur that a landing by force on the main islands would pitch perhaps
some 767,000 U.S. Army troops against an excess of 1,700,000 Japanese
regulars and more than 3,200,000 civilian defense volunteers (not to men-
tion the involvement of U.S. naval and air force personnel) in perhaps one
of the bloodiest battles in the history of war.48 Some 83,500 U.S. troops
were also to be committed to Korea to embattle a predicted 270,000
Japanese regulars and some 35,000 civilian volunteers. 49 Secretary of War
Stimson and the Chief of Staff, General Marshall, had feared that Ameri-
can casualties alone might amount to hundreds of thousands, and that the
Japanese losses would be immense even in relation to allied losses alone. 50
In contrast, the casualties produced by the nuclear weapons are not
precisely known, but estimates range from a total of 566,680 (333,884
killed and 232,796 wounded) to some 226,000 Japanese casualties. 51 It
481 REPORTS OF GENERAL MACARTHUR, MACARTHUR IN JAPAN: THE OCCUPATION,
Supp. at 4 (1966 ed.) (hereinafter cited as MacArthur Report). The exact Allied figures are
unknown to this author-the figure 560,500 can be derived from the proposed occupation
force under Operation "Blacklist," which was only part of the proposed Army troop force to
be used in the massive invasion or Operation "Downfall," infra;and such figures do not take
into account the number of naval and air forces involved. The figure 767,000 troops was
derived from Feis, Bomb, at 10 n. 5, where it is stated that General Marshall had predicted
the need for 767,000 troops by June 18th for the invasion of Kyushu alone. Churchill talks of
a loss of a million American lives "and half that number of British-or more if we could get
them there..." (possibly including army, navy and air forces). CHURCHILL, TRIUMPH AND
TRAGEDY 638 (1953).491d.(MacArthur).
50See Feis, Bomb, at II, 12, and 192-193. Compare id. at 9 concerning an early estimate
of 31,000 U.S. losses in the first 30 days of battle with id. at 12 concerning President
Truman's estimate of 500,000 U.S. lives to be lost; and Churchill's estimate of 1,000,000 U.S.
lives, supra note 48.
51See Falk, at 768 n. 19, stating "(t)here is a considerable difference in the casualties
reported. The plaintiffs list 260,000 killed at Hiroshima, 73,884 at Nagasaki; similar dis-
crepancies exist for the figures on wounded at each place, the plaintiff contending 156,000 at
Hiroshima, 76,796 at Nagasaki, and the defendant 51,408 at Hiroshima, 41,847 at Nagasaki."
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seems that even the high estimates of half a million casualities were fewer
in comparison with the then predictable losses (perhaps a million U.S.
alone), which would have resulted from a clash at arms with some
2,525,000 Japanese regular troops in the homeland area alone-not to
mention the then predictable casualties in Korea or the entry into a mas-
sive death contest by an additionally predictable three and one fifth million
civilian defense volunteers in the homeland. The losses on both sides might
well have been appalling to all except the most ardent and extreme advo-
cates of population control.
One must next inquire into the soundness of the Allied worry over a
protracted war and the resultant death and suffering. Was there a desire to
end the war quickly and avoid such losses, and was there a reasonable
basis for the fear that large casualties would result? There is evidence
available that the United States decision-makers predicted a long and
costly war which would continue into early 1946 at a minimum. 52 Oper-
ation "Downfall" was the overall plan for the final defeat of Japan and it
would entail two phases, "Olympic" and "Coronet. 5 3
Operation "Olympic" would launch an amphibious assault by veteran
troops against southern Kyushu, and later Operation "Coronet" would
launch United States forces into the heart of the Tokyo Plain. As General
MacArthur's report states, "(i)t was expected to be costly. The enemy
would be fighting in prepared positions. He would be fighting for his home,
his family. He had nothing to gain by surrender, everything to lose by
defeat."'54 Who could accurately predict the death and suffering? It would
certainly have been enormous if the two powers met in an obstinate and
protracted war in the Japanese homeland.55
Note that the defendant's (Japan's) estimates are about 60 percent lower. Other figures are
found in COMMAGER, THE POCKET HISTORY OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR 561 and 564
(1945), stating that Hiroshima had a population of 343,000 people but only 10,000 were killed
(relying on early news releases) and that some 126,000 were killed at Nagasaki; Spaight, at
274, stating that the Japanese issued a statement on 6 September 1945, declaring that 49,221
were killed at Hiroshima and only 21,501 at Nagasaki; and HART, HISTORY OF THE SECOND
WORLD WAR 696 (1970) (hereinafter cited as Hart), stating that 80,000 people were killed at
Hiroshima.52See MacArthur Report, at 1, stating, "(e)nemy resistance was to be pulverized in an
invasion drive that would begin in the fall of 1945 and be continued in a second phase in the
spring of 1946." See also Feis, Bomb, at 11, 12 and 192- 193, for evidence of the concern of
Secretary Stimson and General Marshall.
5
"MacArthur Report, at I n. 5. See also Feis, Bomb, at 7. Operation "Olympic" had been
directed by dispatch on May 25th-target date November I st, 1945.
14MacArthur Report at 1. See also CHURCHILL, TRIUMPH AND TRAGEDY 638-639
(1953); at least Churchill, Truman, Marshall and Admiral Leahy had contemplated a pro-
tracted war and "desperate resistance by the Japanese."
55See Feis, Bomb, at 110 (Secretary of War Stimson predicted "the inevitable and
complete destruction of the Japanese armed forces [nearly 2 million], and just as inevitably the
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As historians have indicated there existed a solid basis for the fears of
heavy casualties in the prior experience of United States troop engage-
ments with the enemy, when resistance was considered futile. The battles
on Iwo Jima and Okinawa had shown military strategists that the Japanese
tactics had involved "an obstinate defence-in-depth of the interior"5 6 and
desperate but devastating Kamikaze attacks on our warships. The terrible
losses in the battle for Okinawa, a battle which lasted three months and up
until the dawn of the Potsdam Conference, must have been a major con-
tributing factor to the decision to use the atomic bomb. 57
The total Japanese losses in that area alone were estimated at 110,000,
and Americans had suffered the worst campaign casualties of the war with
the loss of 49,000 (of whom 12,500 were killed). 58 Thirty-four naval ves-
sels had been sunk and 368 damaged by Japanese efforts which had largely
been the result of the nearly 1,500 individual Kamikaze attacks. 59 Further-
more, the United States Strategic Bombing Survey of Japanese Air Power
had predicted that some 5,350 planes were ready for suicide use in the
homeland battle 6" and the United States strategists, despite a heavy pound-
ing of the Japanese main islands, still felt that United States naval forces
were vulnerable to complete or serious destruction.6 1 And General Mar-
shall had estimated on June 18, 1945, that the land invasion alone would be
costly to both combatants:
One of the things that appalled me was the cost in casualties of an in-
vasion .... To get to the plains would have been a very costly operation in
lives. We knew the Japanese were determined and fanatical ... we would
have to exterminate them, almost man by man. 62
It appears that by mid-June President Truman had thoroughly consid-
utter devastation of the Japanese homeland" if peace was not somehow reached soon), at 120
("This sustained the impression that no matter what the odds the Japanese might fight on in
their homeland until death"), and at 192- 193.
56 Hart, at 684-686. This was so even though Japanese commanders had a "characteristic
dislike of defensive action;" id. at 686. See Feis, Bomb, at II concerning General Marshall's
views.57See id. at 686 (Hart); and CHURCHILL, TRIUMPH AND TRAGEDY 638-639 (1953). Note
that the "decision" to use the bomb was being initiated in early June. See Feis, Bomb, at 11,
45, 48 (all pages re: June 1st) and 54 (re: June 16th); but see ibid., at 103 (the order for use of
the bomb was not finally approved until July 25th). See also Feis, Bomb, at 6 and 10.58Hart, at 686.591d.; Cf. Feis, Bomb, at 192 quoting lower figures "definitely attributable to Kamikaze
attack" (emphasis added); ibid., at n. 2.
6
"Feis, Bomb, at 193, adding that about half were training planes.
"Ibid., at 192.62Quoted in Feis, Bomb, at 11; and see Churchill, TRIUMPH AND TRAGEDY 638 (1953).
C.f. Feis, Bomb, at 6, stating that "the losses that would be suffered in the invasion were
acceptable" (perhaps less than 35% were "acceptable" then, but that doesn't answer the
question of death proportionality in connection with land invasion losses vs. bomb losses).
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ered the estimates of casulaties involved in a homeland invasion,6 3 and that
United States casualties would probably not be as high as the 35 percent.
figure connected with the Okinawa battle,64 but it was known that there
were at least two factors which could affect the end results: (1) the Russian
participation in Manchuria and Korea, and (2) the type of actual resistance
that the Japanese would put up against a land invasion. The possibilities
even included the loss of 500,000 lives with an untold amount of human
suffering which could have reached the million casualty figure, and would
certainly have touched the lives of millions more.
6 5
Perhaps we shall never acquire precise figures for the options which
were not to take place; but we do know, as Feis states, that one reason for
the utilization of nuclear weapons was paramount in the minds of the
decision-makers: "that by using the bomb the agony of war might be ended
most quickly and lives be saved." '66
Further problems were involved, however, than the mere balancing of
casualties from the two options of the bomb and a land invasion (or the
third: starvation). The inquiry as to "necessity" should also focus on other
postulated options such as: (1) the starvation strategy plus air assaults; (2)
the test-demonstration theory; (3) the postulated notion that the Japanese
were on the verge of defeat and would give up if only we waited longer;
and (4) the theory that surrender might have followed from a clearer
delineation of the surrender terms, or a change in those terms. Some of
these are interconnected.
The first postulated option, the starvation and conventional air assault
strategy, was actually an incredible proposal as a substitute for the bombs.
Incredible in view of the myopic approach to the total human problems
involved; for although American lives might well have been saved, the
Japanese were to suffer a "suffocating naval blockade and our devastating
air assaults, ' 67 with the result that the Japanese would be starved into
63Feis, Bomb, at 8-9, mentioning an awareness of some 31,000 U.S. casualties in only
the first 30 days of battle, but not exploring total losses to both the U.S. and the Japanese.64ibid., at 10. Apparently 35% of all army, navy and air forces involved.
65See ibid., at 12, quoting President Truman, "General Marshall told me that it might cost
one-half million lives to force the enemy's surrender on his home grounds"; and Secretary
Stimson's fear of one million U.S. casualties. The fear of one million U.S. deaths was
expressed by CHURCHILL, TRIUMPH AND TRAGEDY 638 (1953). Note that it would be
consistent to fear 500,000 lives lost and one million casualties (lives and wounded).66Feis, Bomb, at 192. See also id. at 8, It, 12, 45, and 110 (necessity to avoid utter
devastation of Japan). See also Hart at 692, quoting Churchill, "At any rate, there never was a
moment's discussion as to whether the atomic bomb should be used or not. To avert a vast,
indefinite butchery, to bring the war to an end, to give peace to the world" seemed "a miracle
of deliverance."67See Ibid., at 5 concerning the proposal of some senior naval arid air officers.
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submission or death.68 To say that the starvation of the total population of
millions on Japan and the long human suffering connected with such an
approach to war would have been a viable alternative to the "barbaric
weapon at Hiroshima and Nagasaki" seems incredulous on its face. Never-
theless, some seem content with raising the option in an argument over the
necessity and proportionality involved with the nuclear decision.69
The second postulated option is more difficult to criticize. Perhaps we
will never know whether the Japanese would have surrendered after a
demonstration, but there are two relevant facts worth mentioning: (1) the
Japanese did not in fact surrender even after two nuclear bombs had been
dropped on their cities (so it would hardly seem likely that any other type
of "demonstration" would have been more effective to bring the point
home); and (2) the decision-makers felt that a demonstration would be
insufficient and might prolong the war.
As Secretary Stimson later stated, there was fear that the mechanism for
a drop explosion might not work even though the bomb had in fact been
tested in July. 70 Some scientists had pleaded their desire for a demonstra-
tion,' but a decision was made to use the weapon in war since no technical
demonstration could be proposed by the scientists which would be likely to
bring the war to an end. 72 It was feared that the demonstration might not
work, might not impress them if if did work, and might have prolonged the
war.
Instead it was decided that we should not give the Japanese any "in-
formative warning" as to the nature of the weapons (we did warn the cities
of bombardment and Japan of utter destruction), and that we should utilize
68See Hart, at 697, stating, "the naval blockade alone would have 'starved the Japanese
into submission'-through lack of oil, rice and other essential materials-had we been willing
to wait." There is some evidence that we did not want to wait because of the Russians, see
infra, but that doesn't mean that legality is dissipated-the real question is involved with the
balancing of lives in connection with the bomb or starvation or a whole people.69See, e.g., Hart at 697. One might also ask of the proponents of the starvation strategy
whether they view starvation as more "discriminate" and "controllable" than the bomb (see
text supra re: "indiscriminate" suffering and the law; and see Falk at 773 concerning the
Tokyo Court's reasoning). See also Mudge, Starvation as a Means of Warfare, 4 THE INT'L
LAWYER 228-268(A.B.A. 1970).
70See Hart, at 695; and Feis, Bomb, at 46-48, 54, and 198- 199. This fear was shared by
Byrnes, then a member of the Interim Committee on the Atomic Bomb and later Secretary of
State.71Feis, Bomb, at 52-55. Others had indicated skepticism; ibid., at 46.721bid., at 46, 54 and 56 ("the Interim Committee took cognizance of the reply of the
Scientific Panel. It was unswayed by the Franck Committee's exhortation that the bomb be
demonstrated before use, unconvinced that it would serve our purposes"). This decision was
made on June 1st and apparently was not reconsidered in detail after the successful test in
July.
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the bombs to shock the Japanese into a quick surrender; 73 apparently it
was considered that only by shocking the Japanese, could we have avoided
the long and costly mile-by-mile battle to control the homeland, for with
Iwo Jima and Okinawa as precedents there was little hope of rational
submission.
In fact, military strategists who had devised an alternative plan to Oper-
ation "Downfall," called Operation "Blacklist," in case of a "sudden col-
lapse or surrender of the Japanese Government and High Command"
(emphasis added), 74 had made detailed plans to occupy strategic areas in
case of prolonged localized resistance; 75 and it was only after Hiroshima,
Nagasaki, and the Japanese response that General MacArthur began to
shift over from Operation "Downfall" to Operation "Blacklist" even
though the command was well aware of the Japanese peace feelers through
the embassy in Russia. 76
Perhaps interrelated is the argument that Japan was really on the verge
of defeat and should have readily submitted. Again, this had not been
thought, nor had it been the prior battle experience-the prediction of an
obstinate mile-by-mile resistance must have seemed all the more nearly
correct to decision-makers, as it became evident that the Japanese did not
surrender after ten days of extensive area bombardment and the use of
incendiaries under the strategy of General LeMay, which devastated Tok-
yo, Osaka, Kobe and Nagoya from March 9 to 19, 1945, and the continued
use of air power into July when the nuclear decision became finalized. 77
It is true that enemy shipping and air traffic was almost halted, that
production and food was incredibly low in many areas, 78 but still there
was no surrender and instead an obstinate refusal to consider the Potsdam
Declaration's proposal for peace. 79 Indeed, there was no surrender forth-
73 Ibid., at 47-48 and 198- 199. C.f. Feis, Bomb, at 201, arguing for test disclosure plus a
Potsdam Declaration with more detail. The language used by several writers which relates to
a "shock" purpose of the nuclear usage begins to raise the interconnected legal problems of
terror bombardment or "terrorism" as a strategy; see supra note 27. Here the claim of
necessity merges with the terror effect and in the context of World War I1 those claims were
often merged by both sides of the conflict thus bringing in questions of changed expectation
and reprisal.See McDougal, Feliciano, supra note 27.
74Operation "Blacklist" had been in the making since May, but did not appear in top
commands until July 16, 1945 (the day of the atomic test in New Mexico) and was changed on
July 25th (the day of the bomb orders), and again on August 8th. See MacArthur Report, at 2
and 4.751bid., at 4. See also Feis, Bomb, at 191 (lines 4- 13).
761bid., at 2 n. 8.77See Hart, at 69 1.
7Sflbid., at 691 and 696 ("use of the atomic bomb was not really needed to produce this
result"). See also Feis, Bomb, at 3 and 119.79See COMMANGER, THE POCKET HISTORY OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR 561 (1945);
and Feis, Bomb, at 109- 110, 119- 120, 179, and 199-200,
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coming after the dropping of the bomb on Hiroshima on August 6th-it
took another bomb on Nagasaki to move the power structure towards
acceptance. 80
In fact, after the dropping of the second bomb on August 9th, the
Japanese could not make a final decision to accept peace or continue the
war, until a dramatic decision of the Emperor on August 10th;8 1 and that
decision was put in jeopardy on August 12th by a heated dispute among
Japanese officials which might have ended in a continuation of the war and
utter devastation, had not the Emperor stood firm against the military
dissenters.8 2 It was not until August 14th that the Japanese communicated
acceptance of the offer for peace.
One final question has been asked, however, and that concerns the
speculation surrounding a proposed joint bomb demonstration and more
detailed statements of United States surrender policy and willingness to
allow the continuance of the Japanese Monarchy. 3 It seems true that the
Japanese desire for a continuation of the Emperor's position held up peace
efforts, but it is speculative as to whether or not it was the only drawback
(even if the bomb's potential for devastation had been communicated and
the willingness to allow the Emperor to continue was made known).
Feis seems to have the best insight (or hindsight); but even he is unsure
as to whether it would have worked in July or August,8 4 but declares that it
would not have worked before July. 5 Furthermore, some of the military
leaders seemed undeterred by the bomb attacks on Hiroshima and Naga-
saki or any type of peace proposal, and looked "for a chance to retrieve the
situation," and to inflict great losses on the American side from counter
offensives (apparently utilizing the Kamikaze attacks on our warships).8 6
As Churchill wrote:
... power still lay almost entirely in the hands of a military clique determined
to commit the nation to mass suicide rather than accept defeat. The appalling
destruction confronting them made no impression on this fanatical hierarchy,
8
°See Feis, Bomb, at 119- 120, 139- 141, and 199-200 The military structure minimized
the bomb reports and started to issue announcements of counter measures. This irrational
enemy was perhaps most to blame for the nuclear usage. Feis concluded, ibid., at 179, that the
Japanese would never have surrendered before July, and President Truman's repeated warn-
ing on August 6th was to no avail, ibid., at 123 and 125.
O1See ibid., at 130-132.821bid., at 139-142.
83The question was first raised, it seems, by Secretary Stimson and Under Secretary
Grew in 1947. See Feis, Bomb, at 179.
41bid., at 189 and 201.
85lbid., at 179.
8eSee ibid., at 120, 131, and 139-14 1. The military leaders of Japan, it seems, would have
also refused any Allied occupation even if surrender terms providing for the retention of the
Emperor were more specific.
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who continued to profess belief in some miracle which would turn the scale in
their favor.87
It is impossible to speculate with any greater degree of accuracy, but in
view of the obstinancy of the Japanese military leaders, the reasonable
predictions of casualties, and the outlined view of the war and peace
probabilities held by United States decision-makers, it seems that a con-
clusion can be drawn that the viewpoint that nuclear weapons were neces-
sary to end the war and save lives and human suffering, wag a reasonable
one. Perhaps even a clearer declaration at Potsdam would not have helped
(anyway that is not as directly relevant to legality which is tested primarily
by consideration of the decision-maker's viewpoint in context).
From the legal point of view, then, if cities could constitute valid military
objectives in the total war situation, one could reasonably conclude that the
bombings were reasonably predicted as the most effective means available
for ending the war with the least expenditure of time, lives and suffering,
and were not calculated to bring about any "unnecessary" or in-
discriminate suffering (purpose-wise).
The following part of this article focuses on a related question of strate-
gic benefits connected with the use of the nuclear weapons against Japan.
It should be pointed out that if other purposes entered into the decision to
use the bombs, that would not mean the dissipation of a legality of usage
based on the need to end the Japanese war with less of a human cost. In
fact, most important governmental decisions seem to have multifarious
bases in purpose -that doesn't necessarily affect legal determinations.
B. Stopping Aggression -The Context of
Peace and Strategic Necessity
1. Russian Expansion and Normative Precepts
As the normative values of Articles 2(4) and 51 of the United Nations
Charter were being enacted into international law, there were occurring in
much of Europe threats or uses of force against the territorial integrity of
nations, against the political independence of nations, and in manners
which seemed inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations Char-
ter, which include: (1) the need to maintain international peace and secur-
ity; (2) the taking of collective measures for the suppression of acts of
aggression; (3) the utilization of peaceful means to adjust or settle disputes
or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace; (4) the devel-
opment of friendly relations among nations based upon respect for the
8 7CHURCHILL, TRIUMPH AND TRAGEDY 641 (1953).
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principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples; and (5) to
achieve international cooperation in solving international problems of an
economic, social, cultural or humanitarian character, and in promoting and
encouraging respect for human rights.88
Later the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg was to condemn
aggressive war, and declare before the world that the aggressive acts of
Nazi Germany were violative of international law. But there was no open
disucssion outside of the government circles in Washington and London, of
a new aggression which threatened the very concepts of peace and
self-determination for which the United States had fought on foreign soil
twice in half a century. A new aggression that did not exactly fit into the
scheme of adopted international precepts, but which seemed quite clearly
to ignore the pledges at San Francisco contained in the United Nations
Charter.8 9
With as much "justification" as can be found in Hitler's excuses for
expansion under the "living space" theory, Russia was now expanding her
control and frontiers through a "self defense" or paranoid type of aggres-
sion (defensive aggression). For Russia, fearing a western attack on the
communist existence, thought it must acquire control of a living buffer belt
88See U.N. CHARTER, arts. 1-2; cf art. 51 ("armed attack"). The United Nations Charter
was ratified by the U.S. Senate on July 28, 1945; and it had been signed on June 25th-in the
time context of Russian expansion and the nuclear decision. For a comprehensive analysis of
the relevant shared expectations and content of Article 2(4) of the Charter in 1945 see
McDougal, Feliciano at 177- 179. The prohibition against the use or threat of force was quite
broad-much more so than most writers verbalize today in connection with the incomplete
phrase: "territorial integrity and political independence." Moreover, Stalin's concept of "self'
determination was well known to the West and was courageously challenged by some
socialist/communists such as Rosa Luxemburg; now it is even chastised by the Soviet
Communist Party. Cf infra note 91.
89See U.N. CHARTER, supra note 88; and compare the Russian actions in Eastern Europe
outlined in Feis, Potsdam. The IMT at Nuremberg used aggressive "war" as its legal referent,
and did not criminally charge the defendants directly for the invasions of Austria and
Czechoslovakia (which were before the British declaration of war). See TAYLOR, C.E.I.P.,
NUREMBERG TRIALS-WAR CRIMES AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 263 n. 31 (1949) (hereinafter
cited as TAYLOR, C.E.I.P.). But the Judgement of the IMT stated at 186 (T.M.W.C.), "(t)he
first acts of aggression referred to in the Indictment are the seizure of Austria and Czechoslo-
vakia;" and at 192, that the "invasion of Austria was a pre-meditated aggressive step in
furthering the plan to wage aggressive wars against other countries" (emphasis added).
Moreover, during the subsequent proceedings conducted by the United States "crimes against
peace" were defined to include "invasions" as well as "wars." See at 273,
and IMT FOR THE FAR EAST, CHARTER, Article 5(a) defining "crimes against peace" to
include declared or "undeclared wars." Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter changed the focus
from wars to the "threat or use of force," and although some criteria of "aggression" remain
unclear, there might have been enough to label the Russian take-overs as violative of
international precepts under the Charter even though the action was taken in "occupation" of
territory. For newer developments see The Draft Convention of the Offenses Against Peace
and Security of Mankind, 6 U.N. GAOR, Supp. 9, U.N. Doc. A/1858 (1951); and the Draft
Convention on the Definition of Aggression, U.N. Doc. A/AC.77/L.4 (1956); and McDougal,
Feliciano at 29-30.
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of former nations and control the "self' determination of a great many
people in strategic "self defense." 90
After noting the Russian paranoia and an obstinate quest for dominance
of Poland, Herbert Feis wrote with insight: "How closely aggression
twines around fear; how frequently it feigns to be fear! It is in this dark
tunnel in the nature of nations that peace is most often lost."9 1 And how
revealing are the words of Sir John Wheeler-Bennett on the complexities of
the needed course toward peace and the combating of paranoid aggression
through a "proper" appeasement:
... to appease, to placate-to agree with an adversary while we are in the
way with him-becomes a fundamental purpose of all diplomacy, because it is
a necessary condition of our civilized order which it is the purpose of that
diplomacy to preserve and develop. At the same time, in any but a strictly
pacifist society, the use of force is regarded as legitimate, at any rate for
self-defense, and a successful foreign policy must, therefore, oscillate be-
tween these two apparently opposite poles .... The passionate will to
peace- so right, so laudable, so understandable in itself; that same will which
had, in Britian, prompted a unilateral reduction of armaments to a point
barely compatible with the needs of national defense-now became the pro-
genitor of a profound desire, not to prevent aggression, but to avoid war, and,
90See Feis, Potsdam, at 31. Perhaps paranoia runs deeper when you are ruthless yourself.
The Soviets had signed a pact with Hitler in 1939, and it was the Soviets that had to be
constantly assured of no separate peace attempts by the western allies. See ibid., at 3-5.
Perhaps there was some of the feeling that as Russia had entered into agreement with Hitler
to take some of Poland upon Hitler's advance, perhaps the west would be as ruthless in its
advance-Churchill had devised the percentage deal with the Soviets for a division of Europe
that was hardly in consideration of the aspirations of peoples' self determination. See Feis,
Potsdam. Were the Soviets counting on a British "ruthlessness" in their eyes-an attempt to
regain the Empire and dominate Europe? Mistrust and mutual misconception might have
some play here, but the Russians didn't wait to apply the principles of the U.N. Charter which
had just been signed; in fact, they ignored them and sought unilateral control of coun-
tries-there was no effort to apply the Charter principles at Potsdam.
9
'Feis, Potsdam, at 31. For evidence of a related Soviet elitism and paranoia in search of
a justification for the totalitarian oppression of the proletariat (which, in theory, was itself to
"self' determine the course of all classes instead of allowing a full sharing and shaping of
power by all persons or the free determination of an aggregate self and the full participation of
all persons in governmental and other processes) see e.g., H. MARCUSE, SOVIET MARXISM-A
CRITICAL ANALYSIS (1961); and B. MOORE, TERROR AND PROGRESS USSR(1954). See also
"Solzhenitsyn Assails Liberals in West-Says They\4Use a Dual Morality in Attacks on
Oppression, N.Y.T., Sept. 12, 1973, at 3, col. 4(warning of the danger of appeasement, the
violence of the state and the challenge to human rights); and subsequent press statements of
Sakharov and Solzhenitsyn. It is not surprising that the Soviets still view authority as
eminating from the "will of the ruling class" rather than from the people; still view in-
ternational law as only comprising the "will of states" (which is "essentially the will of [their]
ruling class"); and continue this totalitarian, reactionary ideology in their claims that the "legal
position of individuals is determined by national and not international law" (i.e., the "will of
the ruling class") and that documented human rights must be "observed" in accordance with
the laws of the state(i.e., the "will of the ruling class"). See, e.g., U.S.S.R., Contemporary
International Law 32-33, 164, 167, 239 and 241, passim (Moscow 1970).
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if war should come, to keep out of it.... It is a tragic irony of history that this
very will for peace was among the most important contributory factors to the
Second World War.... In the name of peace and of appeasement they
condoned injustice and aggression .... 92
How difficult the proper choice for peace; and, it seems, this quest for
peace in the face of aggression must have perplexed President Truman
from his assumption of office in April, to the decision to use the nuclear
weapons on Japan in August, 1945, and for many years thereafter. By June
1945, Russia had been making her real intentions concerning a postwar
Europe quite evident. She had no difficulties to balance, for she sought
unilaterally to obtain all the guarantees she needed-treaties and in-
ternational structures had not stopped aggressive attacks against the Soviet
homeland in the past.
But Russia, the President knew, was doing more-she was herself break-
ing all the promises made at Yalta just a few months before, and she was
undermining efforts to create an effective world organization at the San
Francisco Conference. What is worse, she was sending in armies under the
guise of "occupation" and the defeat of the Germans, to control the will of
much of the peoples of eastern Europe in violation of the Declaration of
Liberated Europe made at Yalta that February-a most important part of
U.S. policy.93
President Truman had realized the Russian attempts at take-over in
Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, and Poland as early as May
2, 1945;94 but he saw no effective way of preventing it short of war. 95
Austria was to have been free and independent 96 and Czechoslovakia, it
had been agreed, was not to remain occupied territory,97 but Russia was
92WHEELER-BENNETT, MUNICH-PROLOGUE TO TRAGEDY 3-6 (1948). President John F.
Kennedy was aware of the need for a viable peace and the dangers to peace. At the Berlin
Wall, June 26, 1963, he said: "... if there is one path above all others to war it is the path of
weakness and disunity ... we seek peace but we shall not surrender..."; and during his
Inaugural Address, January 20, 1961: ".... the same revolutionary beliefs for which our
forebears fought are still at issue around the globe .... Let every nation know ... that we
shall pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship ... to assure the survival and the
success of liberty. United there is little we cannot do in a host of cooperative ven-
tures ... divided, we have no peace."93See Feis, Potsdam, at 62. The American government placed a great deal of emphasis on
the Declaration as agreed policy for a post-war Europe (as it did on all principles as opposed
to blatant force or the old world politics which had led so often only to war).94See ibid., at 19-20 (Austria and Czechoslovakia), 31-38 (Poland), 63-64 (Hungary,
Bulgaria and Romania). See also ibid., at 190 (Hungary), 191 (Romania), and 192 (Bulgaria)
for later developments. These had been the countries which Russia had sought to capture
before, but had failed. See e.g., L. TROTSKY, TERRORISM AND COMMUNISMV-Xvi (Ann Arbor
1969).
95See Feis, Potsdam, at 64.961bid., at 49 (from the Moscow Declaration of Nov. 1, 1943).97ibid., at 18-19.
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sending in troops in a way that aroused a fear for the validity of the
Russian promises of thus recent months. 98
After more tensions over Poland and the pressures building up to the
point of open war between western and eastern allies as a result of Yugo-
slavian action, President Truman made two stands to pressure Tito and to
avoid war. On April 11, 1945 he developed a resolve to stop communist
take overs; 99 and told Churchill that Tito should be informed that the
"doctrine of solution by conquest and by unilateral proclamation of sover-
eignty through occupation, the method used by the enemy with such tragic
consequences, has been definitely and solemnly repudiated by the Allied
Governments .... ,,100 And on May 19-20 President Truman stood firm
against Tito's unilateral acts and intransigent refusal to engage in a cooper-
ative effort at peace. 1' 1
Churchill had now been advocating a show of force to the Russians and
to Tito, 10 2 but Truman did not want a show of force which might lead to
open war,'03 and on May 14th turned aside Churchill's appeals for force to
stop the iron curtain from coming down. We were appeasing, placating and
oscillating between the two poles of "evil" appeasement and force. Perhaps
we had been misunderstood by the Soviets and a show of force not to
mention war) would not be desirable at this time since (1) it might harm
efforts to make a more viable and lasting peace through the United Nations
structure; (2) we might need the Soviet army to help in the defeat of Japan;
(3) we did not want to keep large American armies in Europe; (4) it would
be ineffective because the Soviet armies were already in position to shut us
out of eastern Europe by force; and (5) some have postulated that we were
waiting for the bomb. 10 4
On May 25th President Truman sent Harry Hopkins to Moscow to test
the Soviet intentions and to get Russia to settle the crisis in the U.N.
10 5
After all, most American officials "were at one with the American people
98ibid., at 18-21. Officials were becoming estranged-they (western) were "worried over
what Communist Russia had in mind for those parts of Europe and the Far East where it
might extend its influence or control."
99Ibid., at 47. The author uses "resolve" to stop communist take-overs, but at this point
Truman did not know how it would be done-at the conference table, at war, or in some other
way. Earlier, April 23rd, he had told Molotov that friendship with Russia must be on the basis
of mutual observance of agreements, not on the basis of "a one way street." Feis, Bomb, at
36. He must have been bothered by Russian disregard of that declaration.
'
00Feis, Potsdam, at 47. Cf. supra note 76. Truman adopted the new approach.1011bid., at 49-50.
1021bid., at 74-76.
1031bid., at 44 ("1 wish to avoid having American forces used to fight Yogoslavs or being
used in combat in the Balkan arena") and 76.
104See ibid., at 76, 78, 80-81, 85, 88, 176, 233, and 259.105See ibid., at 80-81, 96, 97- 101, 11- 112, and 122.
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in believing this [the U.N. structure to maintain peace] more meaningful
than the troubles over European frontiers or the alignment of the smaller
European states.
History would have its willful way with these, as it always did, and its
way would be war-bringing unless nations could join in a new form of
association, in which justice and humaneness would be parents of
peace. "106
This, was the Truman Doctrine before Potsdam and was still ever in his
mind as he unleashed the fury of nuclear power against Japan. Our most
important effort must be toward the establishment of an effective world
organization, and Soviet cooperation was deemed essential. We had has-
tened to make amends for the "inadvertent" slash in Lend-Lease earlier in
May, 1945.107
We had avoided troop confrontations as the European war was ending;
and now Hopkins would push our policy again before we agree with the
bold appeals of Sir Winston. A rare Russian counter "appeasement" was
made-Truman was somewhat relieved that now (June, 1945) the Russians
were coming around a bit-maybe Britian had also been somewhat to
blame for the Russian paranoid intransigence.108 These illusions of peace
would dissipate at Potsdam, but for now our desired form of peace looked
more promising and the U.N. Charter had been signed-June 25, 1945.
Now one began to plan for the Potsdam meeting (a meeting which had
been put off probably to explore the Soviet intentions, to let the western
allied troops return to their zones, and to await the final testing of the
1061bid., at 85. The kind of peace F.D.R. had wanted (and presumably Truman had
chosen to follow) was described in a speech quoted in COMMAGER, THE POCKET HISTORY OF
THE SECOND WORLD WAR 566 (1945) ("Today we seek a moral basis for peace .. ")
President Truman, in his closing address to the San Francisco Conference, had also declared:
"The Charter is dedicated to the achievement and observance of human rights and fundamen-
tal freedoms. Unless we can attain those objectives for all men and women everywhere ... we
cannot have permanent peace and security in the world." I U.N.C.I.O. Docs. 717(1945). See
also M. McDougal, G. Behr, Human Rights in the United Nations, 58 AM.J.I.L. 603,
612-613(1964).
lO7lbid., at 26-28. This slash in aid had aroused Russian suspicion of the value of
agreements with the U.S. See ibid., at 100- 101. Revisionists might call it a suspicion (U.S.),
mistrust (U.K.) and (U.S.S.R.)-perhaps the latter should be, however, paranoia (U.S.S.R.).
t08 See ibid., at 126 (Davies to Truman). See also Eisenhower's views; ibid., at 80-81 n.
2. No doubt we were experiencing our own Munich euphoria to some degree, and a faith in
agreements in the Locarno tradition. See WHEELER-BENNETT, DISARMAMENT AND SECURITY
SINCE LOCARNO 1925- 1931(1932); and THE PIPE DREAM OF PEACE (1935) (mutual distrust
and suspicion shattered the dream). Nevertheless, Truman had set off for Potsdam with a
sober will. Feis, Potsdam, at 159. Cf, ibid., at 122- 123. It seems that Truman knew that hope
was better than war, but hope was not enough-what more was needed though it seems he did
not know for sure, and would have to find later that not a conference, not a bomb would do,
while America set out for collective security and massive aid to Europe as the next effort.
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bomb).09 The U.S. should avoid boundary disputes at the conference and
give prime importance to initiation of the peace settlements in Europe.' 10
But when the U.S. delegation arrived it found the Soviets even more
intransigent against a cooperative and viable European peace, and relations
became strained beyond repair. Truman now would realize that the honey-
moon was over-Stalin had not only violated the norms of the
F.D.R./Churchill/Stalin accords, but now he went back on the Hop-
kins/Stalin promises in an affront to Truman. The President must now have
grown despondent; was there now no hope for a viable peace through the
United Nations and apart from the old world politics which had resulted in
a succession of European wars?"'
2. Truman Decides at Potsdam
Throughout the agonizing efforts at achieving a cooperative Russian
postwar policy, the decision to use the bomb against Japan had been
emerging. By June 1, 1945, it seemed that that decision was fairly set in
policy, 12 but hopes were still tied to a successful test of the weapon later
in July. The test was successfully made on July 16th and on the 17th
President Truman received the first two messages of test success;" 3 but
upon receiving a more complete report of the bomb, the Groves Memo-
randum, on July 21st, the President became "tremendously pepped up...
and said that it gave him an entirely new feeling of confidence;" 4 the bomb
would be ready for use against Japan in early August. As Churchill ex-
pressed, the relief came from the fact that now we would not need the
Russians for the war against Japan (one of the primary factors in U.S.
appeasement policy or conciliation at Potsdam) and as he thought:
The array of European problems could therefore be faced on their merits and
according to the broad principles of the United Nations. We seemed sud-
denly to have become possessed of a merciful abridgment of the slaughter in
the East and of a far happier prospect in Europe. I have no doubt that these
thoughts were present in the minds of my American friends (emphasis
added.) 115
'09See ibid., at 139 and 80 (Secretary Stimson had advocated in May that we postpone a
meeting until the bomb was developed).
11"Ibid., at 155.
"'See ibid., at 80 and 85.
11 2See Feis, Bomb, at 47-48. British consent was given July 4th. See CHURCHILL,
TRIUMPH AND TRAGEDY 639 (1953).
113lbid., at 74-75.
114Feis, Potsdam, at 17 1, quoting Stimson. For the language of the Groves Memorandum
see ibid., at 165- 171. Churchill seems to have stated that the Memo was received on the 18th,
TRIUMPH AND TRAGEDY 638, but it was received on the 21st.
'"CHURCHILL, TRIUMPH AND TRAGEDY 639 (1953).
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Present they must have been-but what was Truman's strategy for the
use of the bomb? How did it relate to the Russians? In exploring this last
aspect of the nuclear decision we should consider three interrelated ques-
tions: (1) Was the bomb to be used as a threat to the Russians to settle
European boundary and self-determination disputes now flaring up at Pot-
sdam?; (2) Was the bomb to be used as a threat to keep the Russians out of
Manchuria and to leave the Far East subject to our dominance?; or (3)
Was the bomb to be used so as to make the Russians more willing to
participate in the United Nations and to make it a viable institution for
peace (the avoidance of war)?
Whatever the answers were, there remains the perplexing reality of the
Truman efforts at Potsdam. After he had obtained knowledge of the fact
that the United States alone possessed a tremendous power, and though he
was determined to use it against Japan if peace initiatives were not produc-
tive, the fact remains that President Truman did not use the bomb in a
direct threatening manner so as to force the Russians to agree to U.S.
proposals at Potsdam.116 He now stood up to the Russian demands and "in
a most emphatic manner" told them "that they absolutely could not have
certain demands ... "117 but there were no direct threats. Feis states that
"the Americans at Potsdam either did not know how to use their com-
mand of the new weapon effectively as a threat, or chose not to use it in
that way;" 8 but he later indicates what his answer to our question would
be:
Was not the American government resting the whole structure of its policy on
a conviction that situations and disputes were to be settled only be peaceful
means and orderly procedures? ... Even if Russia could be frightened or
coerced by the bomb to give in against its will on matters before the confer-
ence, would the West be well served if in consequence it turned against the
United Nations? Such, in so far as I can gather, was the trend of the sober
reflections of those who guided American diplomatic and military decisions in
Potsdam. 11 9
This, as has been alleged before, seems to have been the Truman Doc-
trine-that we must make the United Nations viable and peace lasting.
Truman had been warned that the Russians might possibly develop the
weapon in a few years,1 20 and a show of force might be the end of efforts to
"'See Feis, Potsdam. at 179. Churchill, it seems, was more in favor of using the bomb to
force the Russians toward agreement at Potsdam. See Feis, Potsdam, at 172 and 175; and
Feis, Bomb, at 87 (Churchill told Stimson that he was rather inclined to use the bomb as an
"argument" in our favor). See also ibid., at 58-59(Churchill to Byrnes).
"17 Feis, Bomb, at 87.
"'Feis, Potsdam, at 179.
119 1d.120Feis, Bomb, at 43-44 (some thought in 3-5 years; Byrnes had thought it would be
longer), and 51; and see Feis, Potsdam, at 178.
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achieve nuclear disarmament.121 It was agreed that the Russians should be
told something about the bomb; but since they were acting contrary to a
nation ready to participate in a viable U.N., and a cooperative effort in
postwar Europe, the decision was made to casually tell Stalin about the
existence of the bomb and to not inform him of its nature until an agree-
ment could later be reached for international control and inspection.' 22
A delicate situation-the "S-I was a royal straight flush, and we must
not play it foolishly ... let our actions speak for themselves," had been the
opinion of Secretary Stimson.' 2 3 Feis notes that the bomb was left to make
its own impress, and questions that decision; 2 4 but perhaps others shared
the view of Stimson that "the new discovery made it compulsory for
nations to behave differently to each other than ever in the past,' 1 25 and
maybe the decision-makers thought that our actions against Japan would
"speak for themselves" and force the Soviets to seek a cooperative dis-
armament.
If so, we had overplayed the hope and Truman would have to learn that
conferences plus bombs do not alone make a peace-we would have to
seek collective security, nuclear deterrence, and an economically sound
Europe in the years to come as the Russians refused to budge and an arms
race began.
These developments indicate that the United States did not want to use
the new weapon as a threat to achieve Russian acceptance of our boundary
demands and self-determination desires, though the explosion was thought
to make the Russians less obstinate and unilateral in their thinking. As
stated earlier, we wanted to avoid boundary disputes-the U.N. was more
important than the troubles over European boundaries. 1 26 We were willing
to bargain on these issues (before and after knowledge of the bomb
tests).1 2 7 As Feis notes, a casual disclosure that we had a new weapon was
hardly the way to make an effective threat (to play your "royal straight
flush" if your purpose was tied to the European frontier disputes).
Similarly, I doubt that the strategy had been to use the bomb as a threat
12 1Official opinion from the start had emphasized the need for international inspection and
control; Feis, Potsdam, at 174 and 176; and see ibid., at 88. See also Feis, Bomb, at 38, 49,
52 and 55.12 2See Feis, Bomb, at 100-101; and Feis, Potsdam, at 176. As Truman left Potsdam he
was firmly resolved not to share the knowledge with the Russians until there was a satisfac-
tory accord for control and inspection; ibid., at 321-322. Still a reliance on accords? Had not
Truman gone to Potsdam with more hope?
123 Feis, Potsdam, at 80.124 Feis, Bomb, at 49-50 and 103.
1251bid., at 50 (words of Feis).
t26 Feis, Potsdam, at 85, 155, 233, and 259.
12 71d. at 80, 199 and 259 (Byrnes proposals), 234 (Truman boldly offered to bargain off
Western concessions on the one hand for Soviet concessions on the other), and 3 18.
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to keep the Russians out of Manchuria, though the problem of Russian
dominance there might be solved by an explosion over Japan if it would
make the Russians less obstinate, and a quick.end of the Japanese war
before the Russian troops moved on the 8th of August would make their
dominance by "occupation less likely.", President Truman had been told
that the bomb could be ready by August 1 st and the Russians had declared
that they would be ready to move into Manchuria on August 8th..
After the Groves Memorandum 'had been read, Truman initiated t he
order to use the weapons on July 25th unless Japan would respond in an
acceptable fashion.12 8 Test flights had been made on July 20th, air leaflets
were dropped on Japan on the 27th, and. on the 30th Japan refused the
Potsdam surrender ultimatum ignoring the warning of a "prompt and utter
destruction;" but a storm had slowed up the schedule which could have
placed the bomb on Hiroshima by July 31st before the. Potsdam Confer-
ence had ended and the Russians could act.'2 9
There could be no doubt that some United States decision-makers did
not want to prompt the Russians into troop movements' 3 0 and that most all
feared Russian intentions in the Far East. Truman was surprised at the
Russian request to enter the war on July 29th;13 1 was Truman counting on
ending the war before the Russians had officially entered and could move
their troops into Manchuria? Did Truman share the views of Byrnes
concerning the strategic necessity involved in the timing of the nuclear
decision?
At least he later wrote that our position on Japanese occupation had
been formulated "some time ago," and that he was "determined that the
Japanese occupation should not follow in the footsteps of the German
experience .... ,,13 2 Furthermore, Secretary Stimson had warned Truman
on the 16th of July that the Soviets were training one or two divisions of
Koreans to probably accompany the Red Army advance into Korea, and of
his anxiety over Soviet domination-or as he wrote, of "the Polish ques-
tion transplanted to the Far East.' 1 33
Though there were fears of Russian dominance in the Far East, I do not
think that the bomb was used to constitute the basis for a direct threat to
Soviet expansion, but to end the war quickly before it (Soviet dominance)
could get underway. General MacArthur had earlier warned that you
128 Feis, Bomb, at 103.1291bid., at 114.
l30 See id. at 101 and I I n.,84(views of Byrnes).
13 11bid., at 110- 111.
'
32Ibid., at 137. See also id. at 133 and 194.
'
33ibid., at 165.
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couldn't stop- the Russians from gaining control over Manchuria, Korea
and part of northern China anyway, 34 and this was told to Secretary
Stimson by General Marshall on July 23rd (after knowledge of the bomb
test and its potential for devastation). 135
The strategy was to end the war suddenly before Russia could move in
with ease, and to demonstrate the need for a cooperative attitude on their
part so that the war allies could avoid boundary disputes and old world
politics and start mankind on the journey to a more lasting, viable peace
through the United Nations structure; but Stalin proved incapable of
changing from old world theory to that of the new.1 36 It was thought,
though, that with this terrible weapon now a fact, man must rationally
agree to live in a workable peace-and a workable peace was our highest
desire, our strongest intention.' 3 7
After the explosion of the first bomb at Hiroshima President Truman
stated to the world:
I shall recommend that the Congress of the United States consider promptly
the establishment of an appropriate commission to control the production and
use of atomic power within the United States. I shall give further consid-
eration and make further recommendations to the Congress as to how atomic
power can become a powerful and forceful influence toward the maintenance
of world peace.13 8
We would, and must, try.
1341bid., at 13 (February 1945).
1351bid., at 89. Stimson presumably was to tell this to the President.
136See ibid., at 50 and 196.137See Feis, Potsdam, at 85, 88, 176, 179, 233, and 259; and Feis, Bomb, at 124.
138Feis, Bomb, at 124; see also WHEELER-BENNETT, MUNICH- PROLOGUE TO TRAGEDY
7(1948), "What, then, is the answer, since all must be agreed that 'to avoid war must be the
highest ambition of statesmanship'? It lies surely, first, in the proposition that disarmament
must follow-and not precede-the establishment of an effective system of security." For a
somewhat different and comprehensive inquiry into the modern complexities of nuclear power
for peace see WILLRICH, GLOBAL POLITICS OF NUCLEAR ENERGY (1971); Boskey, Will-
rich(eds.), NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION: PROSPECTS FOR CONTROL (1970); and WILLRICH,
NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY: FRAMEWORK FOR NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL(1969).
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